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Introduction
"See how this river comes me cranking in, And cuts me from the best of all my 
land . . . "  William Shakespeare No. 1 Henry IV, Act 3, Scene 1, Lines 97-98.
“If it’s on the river, it’s all screwed up.”
J. H. Evans, free advice to Bob Honea.
“Honea, that has to be the most boring topic in the history of the Institute.”
One o f my partners, upon receiving the flyer for this Institute.
When I let Chuck Morgan talk me into speaking on this topic, I acquiesced on the 
misguided assumption that this subject was a simple one, on which I could prepare a 
paper in a brief afternoon, take credit for extra hours for being a speaker, and make it to 
the track in plenty of time for the first race. I have since found that the quotes set forth 
above accurately summarize this subject. It is indeed mind-numbingly boring, and to 
make matters worse arises infrequently. At the same time, when a riparian rights 
problem is encountered, it is invariably a Pandora’s box of problems -  those who embark 
to resolve such an issue seem to consistently complain of finding themselves up to their 
elbows in alligators, when all they really wanted to do was drain the swamp. It is 
certainly the position I have found myself in, both in the course of advising clients and in 
the course of preparing this paper.
That having been said, I believe that the problems created by riparian rights law 
all have their roots in the fact that this body of law has the practical effect of creating a 
moving target. The very boundaries of a person’s land, and the boundaries between 
states and counties, can be altered substantially, by circumstances beyond anyone’s 
control. Worse yet, there is nothing in the public records which can be relied on to 
establish if, when, where, how, and to what extent boundaries may have changed. It is, 
instead, an area of the law in which it is truly every man for himself, and often no one 
knows who owns what until an appellate court issues a final ruling.
I have attempted in this paper to summarize in as concise a format as possible the 
applicable legal principles. Unfortunately, as those of you who have encountered a 
riparian rights issue have learned, knowing the applicable rules of law doesn’t solve your 
problem, it only tells you what your problem is.
Nevertheless, I hope that the discussion that follows will prove useful.
I. Historical Background
The roots of modem American law on riparian rights are found in the common 
law of England as it existed in the early eighteenth century. English law at that time 
divided waters into two categories, navigable and non-navigable. The bed of navigable 
waters belonged to the king, while the bed of non-navigable waters belonged to the 
owners of the dry land on either side. The reason for the distinction between navigable 
and non-navigable waters was the belief that the right and ability to control navigation, 
fishing, and other commercial activity was an essential attribute of the king’s sovereignty. 
The theory was that the king held such lands (and waters) in trust for all the people, for 
the common good.
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The dividing line between navigable and non-navigable waterways under English 
common law was the point at which one could no longer observe the effect of tides on the 
level of the water. If the ebb and flow of the tide could be confirmed, the water (and the 
land under it) belonged to the king; if not, the land and water belonged to the adjoining 
landowners. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Ramsey. 53 Ark. 314 
(1890).
As to navigable waterways, the boundary line between the king’s land and the 
riparian owner was the high water mark. As to non-navigable waterways, the adjoining 
owners each took “usque ad medium filum aquae” (literally, “to the middle”). Finally, 
English common law recognized the doctrine of accretion, i.e., the premise that as the 
action of the wind, waves, and current washed land from one shore and deposited it on 
another, the boundary line between the respective owners shifted also, whether the water 
be navigable or not. Ramsey, supra; Shively, infra.
When the thirteen original colonies declared their independence from Great 
Britain, they claimed title to the beds of all navigable waterways within their borders, on 
the ground that they were the sovereign successor to the English crown. See Shively v. 
Bowlby. 152 U.S. 1, 14 S. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331 (1894). As subsequent states were 
admitted to the Union, the “equal footing” doctrine required that such states be admitted 
to the Union on the same basis as the original thirteen colonies, to include the right to 
sovereign ownership of the beds of all navigable waterways. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan. 
3 How. 212, 11 L. Ed. 565 (1845).
As the states acquired title to navigable waterways, most also adopted, by statute 
or constitutional provision, the entire body of English common law, en masse, to include
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the previously described rules concerning the definition of navigability, the point at 
which boundary lines were to be drawn, and the concept of accretion. See Ark. Code 
Ann. § 1-2-119 (Repl. 1996).
This brief history lesson can be distilled to a few general principles that form the 
basis of modem American law on riparian rights: First, the states own the bed of 
navigable waters, to the high water mark; second, as to non-navigable waters, the 
adjoining (riparian) owners take to the “middle”; third, as the banks of rivers and lakes 
shift, so do the boundaries; and, fourth, any controversies concerning riparian rights are 
governed by state law. For a good summary of the history of this subject, I refer you to 
Utah Division of State Lands v. United States, et al., 482 U.S. 193, 107 S. Ct. 2318, 96 L. 
Ed. 2d 162 (1987), and Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel 
Company. 429 U.S. 363, 97 S. Ct. 582, 50 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1977).
II. Navigability
A. The General Rule
The obvious starting point for any discussion of riparian rights is the question of 
whether or not a particular body of water is “navigable.” The early American decisions 
followed the English common law, that any water in which the tide ebbed and flowed 
was navigable. The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). It 
soon became apparent, however, that this rule would not work in America. In England, 
the commercial usefulness of a body of water was by and large equivalent to whether it 
was close enough to the ocean to be affected by tides. In America, there were numerous 
rivers and lakes which were clearly commercially useful, but which were far removed 
from the effect of the ebb and flow of tides.
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In 1851, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the English definition of
navigability in favor of one more suited to conditions in the United States. The Propeller
Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The general import of the
Genessee Chief case and later decisions was to the effect that waters are navigable in law
when they are navigable in fact, and that rivers are navigable in fact “when they are used
or susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water.” The Daniel Ball. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). A few years later,
the United States Supreme Court defined navigability in these terms:
“It is not, however, . . . every small creek in which a fishing skiff or 
gunning canoe can be made to float at high water which is deemed 
navigable, but, in order to give it the character of a navigable stream, it 
must be generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade or 
agriculture.”
The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 442 (1874).
The State of Arkansas has adopted a similar definition of navigability. See, e. g.,
Parker. Commissioner of Revenue v. Moore. 222 Ark. 811, 262 S.W. 2d 891 (1953),
where the Arkansas Supreme Court held:
“But our own decisions and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have 
given the term [navigability] a practical meaning -  a construction in 
keeping with realistic concepts of transportation.” (Citations omitted)
Judge William C. Hook of the Eighth Circuit, in dealing with an Arkansas 
appeal, said that it was necessary -  in order to meet the test of navigability 
as understood in American law -  that a watercourse should be susceptible 
of use for purposes of commerce or possess a capacity for valuable 
floatage in the transportation to market of the products of the country 
through which it runs. It should, he said, be of practical usefulness to the 
public as a highway in its natural state and without the aid of artificial 
means. A theoretical or potential navigability, “or one that is temporary, 
precarious, and unprofitable, is not sufficient.”
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We agree with Judge Hook’s assertion that “to be navigable a 
watercourse must have a useful capacity as a public highway of 
transportation.”
Other Arkansas cases utilizing this or an equivalent definition of navigability 
include McGahhey v. McCollum, Administrator. 207 Ark. 180, 179 S.W. 2d 661 (1944), 
and St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314 
(1890). For a good summary of the law of navigability in the State of Arkansas prior to 
State v. McIlroy, infra, see The Vitality of the Navigability Criterion in the Era of 
Environmentalism. 25 Ark. Law Review 250 (1971).
B. State v. McIlroy
The foregoing definition of navigability was consistently applied in the State of 
Arkansas for well over a hundred years, until the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court 
in State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark. 227, 595 S.W. 2d 659 (1980), a case concerning the 
navigability of the Mulberry River. McIlroy arose from a dispute between recreational 
users of the Mulberry River, primarily canoers, and the owners of the lands adjoining the 
river. Under Arkansas law, if a body of water is non-navigable, the riparian owner not 
only owns the bed of the stream, but has the right to exclude others from using the water 
overlying his land. Medlock v. Galbreath. 208 Ark. 681, 187 S.W. 2d 545 (1945). The 
owners of lands adjoining the Mulberry, relying on this principle, initiated litigation 
seeking injunctive relief prohibiting the recreational use of the Mulberry. The State of 
Arkansas intervened, claiming that the Mulberry was navigable and that the bed of the 
stream therefore belonged to the State, for the use and benefit of the public.
In a lengthy opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged the historical 
definition of navigability set forth above, and went so far as to state that “therefore, a
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river is legally navigable, if actually navigable and actually navigable if commercially 
valuable.” Id. at 235. After recognizing that this was the proper definition of 
navigability, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court went on to hold that the Mulberry 
River was in fact navigable, notwithstanding the fact that the proof, by any reasonable 
reading, only established recreational uses. The decision drew a vigorous and lengthy 
dissent. One point made by the dissent, and completely ignored by the majority, was the 
fact that the McIlroy decision worked a substantial change in vested property rights. 
Applying the McIlroy definition of navigability, any stream that could float a canoe, even 
part of the year, would arguably be navigable, thus vesting title to the minerals 
underlying the bed of the stream in the State of Arkansas.
The mischief caused by the McIlroy decision as it relates to title to the oil, gas, 
and minerals underlying the Mulberry River was quickly resolved by statute. In 1981, 
the Arkansas legislature quitclaimed the bed of the Mulberry River to the adjacent 
riparian owners, reserving an easement for the use of the public in the water itself. Ark. 
Code Ann. § 22-5-406. The statute includes a procedure by which affected riparian 
owners can obtain a quitclaim deed from the Arkansas Land Commissioner. 
Interestingly, the statutory quitclaim conveyed all of the Mulberry River, even though the 
lower stretches of it were probably properly characterized as navigable by the old 
definition. Indeed, I am curious as to whether there are producing units which include 
the lower part of the Mulberry River, on which royalties are being paid to the State of 
Arkansas even though the State no longer owns such lands.
There have been no decisions since McIlroy in which any effort was made to 
apply the “new” definition of navigability to other streams or waterways. My prediction
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is that if and when this issue should arise again, the McIlroy decision will be discredited, 
and the Arkansas Supreme Court will instead adopt a “public easement” theory which 
allows a ruling in favor of the recreational users, but leaves title, and specifically title to 
oil, gas, and minerals, as it was. In any event, if the Arkansas Supreme Court followed 
McIlroy literally, I would guess that the Arkansas legislature would in turn follow its 
precedent of quitclaiming the oil, gas, and minerals to the adjoining landowners, just as it 
did in the case of the Mulberry River. Nevertheless, McIlroy is the latest pronouncement 
of the Arkansas Supreme Court on the definition of navigability, and on its face it says 
that if you can float a canoe on a body of water, even part of the year, it is navigable and 
the State owns it.
C. The Position of the Corps of Engineers and the Land Commissioner
If you call the Arkansas Land Commissioner’s office and ask the Land 
Commissioner to tell you what lands the State of Arkansas claims are navigable, you will 
be told that the Land Commissioner believes that anything the Corps of Engineers 
considers navigable is owned by the State of Arkansas. I am attaching as Exhibit A to 
this paper a copy of the printout listing the streams located in the Little Rock District of 
the Corps of Engineers which are considered navigable by the Corps. I suggest that you 
will find it interesting reading. For example, the White River is considered navigable all 
the way to the Highway 45 bridge in Goshen, Arkansas. For those of you unfamiliar with 
the State of Arkansas, Goshen is located a few miles east of Fayetteville, in the northwest 
comer of the State, upstream of Beaver Lake. Believe it or not, those of you who have 
enjoyed trout fishing on the White River have actually been floating on a navigable 
waterway, at least according to the Corps of Engineers.
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My guess is that there are quite a few producing units which include lands listed 
on Exhibit A, and which have not been leased from the State of Arkansas, on the 
assumption that the body of water was not navigable and that the adjoining landowners 
therefore held title. In fact, I know of at least one instance in which this exact situation 
recently occurred -  a third party purchased a lease from the State of Arkansas for lands in 
a producing unit, and the third party then notified the operator that it intended to fully 
participate the interest. I do not know whether this dispute has been resolved, and if so, 
what the outcome was.
D. Can “Navigability” End, And If So, What Happens?
The Arkansas Supreme Court has very clearly held that “once navigable, always
navigable” is not the rule in the State of Arkansas. Parker. Commissioner of Revenue v.
Moore, supra. The Arkansas Supreme Court has further held that “once the navigability
of a stream ceases, the rights of the riparian owner attach.” Gill v. Porter. 248 Ark. 140,
450 S.W. 2d 306 (1970). “. . . [T]he State’s title rests on navigability and . . . once the
navigability of a stream ceases, the rights of the riparian owner attach . . ..” Gill v.
Porter. 248 Ark. 142, 450 S.W. 2d 306 (1970). See also Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas.
252 Ark. 958, 482 S.W. 2d 598 (1972), in which the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed
and adopted the following opinion of the chancellor:
“At the moment of, or upon the closing of the old river channel and the 
opening of the new cut-off, the old river channel ceased to be navigable, 
as was intended; and thus the State lost its claim or title thereto; and title 
to the old river bed vested in the then riparian owners.”
This rule applies whether the cause of the cessation of navigability is natural or man- 
made. Porter, supra; United States v. Keenan. 753 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1985).
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There is also a statute in Arkansas which codifies this rule, at least as to dry lands 
above the ordinary high water mark. It reads, in pertinent part:
(a) “The title to all lands which have formed or may form in the beds of 
non-navigable lakes, or in abandoned river channels or beds, whether or 
not still navigable, which reformed lands or alluvia are above the ordinary 
high water mark, shall vest in the riparian owners to the lands and shall be 
assessed and taxed as other lands.”
(b) “The lands referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall include 
those lands which have emerged or which may emerge by accretion, 
reliction, evaporation, drainage, or otherwise from the beds of lakes or 
from former navigable streams, whether by natural or artificial causes, or 
whether or not the lakes were originally formed from the channel or 
course of navigable or nonnavigable streams.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-404 (Repl. 1996). (There is also a companion statute which sets
forth a procedure for obtaining a deed from the State of Arkansas for such lands, Ark.
Code Ann. § 22-5-405 (Repl. 1996)).
It would seem from the foregoing that this issue is relatively straightforward. If 
the body of water is no longer navigable, the State’s title ends, and ownership vests 
immediately, at the moment navigability ceases, in the riparian landowners.
If you make the mistake of asking the Land Commissioner to state Arkansas’ 
position on this topic, however, you don’t necessarily get a straight answer. I am 
attaching as Exhibit B to this paper a letter from the Land Commissioner, attaching an 
opinion letter from the Attorney General’s office. The Land Commissioner’s position 
statement and the AG’s opinion concern a bend in the river that was cut off when the 
Corps of Engineers dredged a new channel. The work performed by the Corps of 
Engineers would appear to have very clearly terminated the navigability of this body of 
water -  at either end, the Corps of Engineers constructed dikes and revetments, of such a 
size and shape that the old river channel was entirely cut off from the new river channel
10
by dry land. It would seem logical to conclude that navigability ended when the dikes 
and revetments were constructed, landlocking the old river channel. Not so. According 
to the attached AG’s opinion letter and the Land Commissioner’s position statement, as 
long as there is still standing water, the State claims title, unless and until the final 
decision of a court of competent jurisdiction concludes that navigability has ceased.
E. Artificially Created Navigable Waters
By statute, Arkansas has disclaimed any interest in mineral rights underlying 
navigable waters which have been artificially created. Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-815 (Repl. 
1996). This statute includes a procedure whereby the owner of such lands can obtain a 
deed from the State of Arkansas.
F. Conclusion
I told you in the first part of this paper that the State owns the bed of navigable 
waters, and that the riparian owners hold title to the bed of non-navigable waters. I have 
now given you the historical definition of navigability, as it exists in Arkansas today, a 
statement of what the Corps of Engineers considers navigable, and a statement of the 
position of the Land Commissioner of the State of Arkansas as to what it is, exactly, the 
State claims title to. I challenge you to sort through all of this and come up with a clear- 
cut criteria for determining where navigability starts and stops. For my part, I again 
quote J. H. Evans: “If it’s on the river, it’s all screwed up.”
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IV. Accretion and Avulsion
A. Definitions and Distinctions
The concepts of accretion and avulsion are easily stated, but difficult of 
application. The Arkansas Supreme Court defined accretion in the early case of St. 
Louis. Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314 (1890) in 
these terms:
“Accretion is the increase of real estate, by the addition of portions of soil 
by gradual deposition, through the operation of natural causes, to that 
already in the possession of the owner.” Id. at 323.
Six years later, in the case of Wallace v. Driver. 61 Ark. 429 (1896), the Arkansas
Supreme Court elaborated on the definition of accretion, describing it in these terms:
“In order to constitute an accretion, it is not necessary that the formation 
be indiscernible by comparison at two distinct points of time. It is true 
that it is an addition to riparian land, “gradually and imperceptibly made 
by the water to which the land is contiguous;” but the true test “as to what 
is gradual and imperceptible in the sense of the rule is that, though the 
witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they 
could not perceive it while the process was going on..””
In both Ramsey and Wallace, the Court recognized that where the water’s edge
has shifted by the process of accretion, the boundary lines have shifted with the water.
“Hence, land formed by alluvion, or the gradual and imperceptible 
accretion from the water, and land gained by reliction, or the gradual and 
imperceptible recession of the water, belong to the owner of the 
contiguous land to which the addition is made.” Wallace, supra, at 431.
The concept and definition of accretion, and the effect of accretion on boundary
lines, is to be distinguished from avulsion. In a broad sense, avulsion is the exact
opposite of accretion. Stated differently, where the change in the location of a body of
water is sudden and perceptible, the change is described as an avulsion, rather than an
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accretion. Also, and again in contradistinction to the rules that apply to accretion,
boundary lines do not change with a shift in the location of the body of water resulting
from an avulsion. Instead, they remain and become fixed at their former location.
“The reverse of what has been said of accretions and erosions is true of 
avulsions. Where a stream which forms a boundary line of lands from any 
cause suddenly abandons its old, and seeks a new, bed, or suddenly and 
perceptibly washes away its banks, such change of channel or banks (if its 
limits can be determined) works no change of boundary. The owner still 
holds his title to the submerged land.” Wallace, supra, at 436.
In a case involving a dispute between Arkansas and Tennessee over the boundary
line between the states, Arkansas v. Tennessee. 246 U.S. 158, 38 S. Ct. 301, 62 L. Ed.
638 (1918), the United States Supreme Court described the two concepts, and the effect
of the distinction between them, in the following terms:
“When the bed and channel are changed by the natural and gradual 
processes known as erosion and accretion, the boundary follows the 
varying course of the stream; while if the stream from any cause, natural 
or artificial, suddenly leaves its old bed and forms a new one, by the 
process known as an avulsion, the resulting change of channel works no 
change of boundary, which remains in the middle of the old channel, 
although no water may be flowing in it, and irrespective of subsequent 
changes in the new channel.”
Other Arkansas cases discussing accretion and avulsion include Home v. Howe 
Lumber Company. 209 Ark. 202, 190 S.W. 2d 7 (1947), Crow v. Johnston. 209 Ark. 
1053, 194 S.W. 2d 193 (1946), and Yutterman v. Grier. 112 Ark. 366, 166 S.W. 749 
(1914). For a good summary of the Arkansas cases on accretion and avulsion prior to 
1951, see Real Property -  Riparian Rights -  Accretion. Reliction, and Avulsion. 6 Ark. 
Law Rev. 68 (1951). One footnote is appropriate here -  although it seems obvious, it 
bears emphasis that the rules of accretion and avulsion apply equally to navigable and 
non-navigable waters.
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From the foregoing discussion, two conclusions can be drawn. First, if the 
location of a body of water has changed, it has been due to either accretion or avulsion. 
There is no gray area in between; the movement was due to one or the other. Second, if 
the movement of the body of water was due to accretion, the boundaries of the adjoining 
landowners shifted with it, but if the movement was due to avulsion, the boundary lines 
not only stayed where they were, they became fixed and permanent.
Having set forth the general rules, I am afraid I can provide you with little 
guidance as to how these rules should be applied in the real world. For example, if there 
has ever been any movement of a body of water due to an avulsion, the boundary lines 
between the riparian owners became fixed, never to change again regardless of any 
subsequent accretion, erosion, or avulsion. Needless to say, if one were inclined to argue 
the point, it would seem easy to find evidence somewhere, at some point in time, that the 
body of water in question was at a location you wanted it to be, then put together some 
kind of proof that its subsequent movement was due to an avulsion. A good example is 
McGee v. Matthews, 241 F. Supp. 300 (E. D. Ark. 1965), in which the party claiming an 
avulsion presented expert testimony that the type and age of trees on the land in question 
proved that the river’s movement was due to an avulsion, and not an accretion. Another 
example is Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289, 94 S. Ct. 1046 (1973), in which the 
party claiming an avulsion had a geologist take soil borings, then testify that the soil 
layers were inconsistent with the concept of accretion.
There are numerous other Arkansas cases in which the distinction between 
accretion and avulsion has been litigated. For my part, the only common thread I can see 
in the cases is that the party who has the burden of proof seems to lose the vast majority
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of the cases. There is a stated presumption in favor of accretions. Pannell v. Earls, 252 
Ark. 385, S.W. 2d 440 (1972). Nevertheless, I cannot distill from the cases any one fact 
or set of facts which appears to be dispositive of whether the movement was accretion or 
avulsion. Again, this is an area of the law in which each case turns on its facts, and no 
one can know for sure what the final resolution will be until the appellate court issues its 
mandate.
B. Acts of Man -  Accretion or Avulsion?
In cases where the change in the location of a body of water is due to the acts of 
man, and specifically the acts of the Corps of Engineers, every Arkansas decision I have 
read holds that such changes are due to an avulsion, and not an accretion. See, e.g., 
Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas Company, supra. Indeed, I could find no Arkansas case 
in which the argument was even raised that changes due to the acts of man constitute an 
accretion, rather than an avulsion. I must also point out, however, that the United States 
Supreme Court has reached the opposite result, at least where the acts of man do not 
change the location of the channel, but only narrow it. In Bonelli Cattle Company v. 
Arizona. 414 U.S. 313, 94 S. Ct. 517 (1973), the actions of the Corps of Engineers in 
channeling the Colorado River had the effect of narrowing its bed, thereby creating dry 
land. The location of the channel itself, however, was not changed. The Supreme Court 
held that the newly formed dry land was an accretion rather than an avulsion.
The conclusion I draw from Bonelli is that if the acts of man do not change the 
location of the channel, but rather only confine and restrict it to a narrower area, there is 
at least an argument to be made that any resulting dry land is due to an accretion, rather
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C. The “Accretion Exception” Rule
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court has never addressed this issue, other courts 
have recognized the “accretion exception” rule. The typical fact pattern in which this 
exception arises is a situation where a river has looped back on itself, creating a peninsula 
with only a narrow strip of land at the base of the peninsula dividing the flow of the river. 
When the river gradually and slowly cuts a new channel across the narrow neck of land, 
ultimately creating a new channel and leaving an ox-bow, some courts have concluded 
that the rules of avulsion should apply, notwithstanding the fact that the change in the 
location of the channel was due to the gradual and imperceptible process of accretion and 
erosion. The United States Supreme Court, in Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. 
Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. 363, 97 S. Ct. 582 (1977), stated the rule in these 
terms:
than an avulsion. This precise argument has never been addressed under Arkansas law,
and it therefore remains an open question in this state.
“[The accretion rule] is applicable to and governs cases where the 
boundary line, the thread of the stream, by the slow and gradual processes 
of erosion and accretion creeps across the intervening space between its 
old and its new location. To this rule, however, there is a well-established 
and rational exception. It is that, where a river changes its main channel, 
not by excavating, passing over, and then filling the intervening place 
between its old and its new main channel, but by flowing around this 
intervening land, which never becomes in the meantime its main channel, 
and the change from the old to the new main channel is wrought during 
many years by the gradual or occasional increase from year to year of the 
proportion of the waters of the river passing over the course which 
eventually becomes the new main channel, and the decrease from year to 
year of the proportion of its waters passing through the old main channel 
until the greater part of its waters flow through the new main channel, the 
boundary line between the estates remains in the old channel subject to 
such changes in that channel as are wrought by erosion or accretion while 
the water in it remains a running stream.” Id  at 368, 585.
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As I have already indicated, this precise issue has never been directly considered
or addressed by the Arkansas Supreme Court. There is a federal district court case
applying Arkansas law, however, in which this exact fact pattern was presented. The
court there never discussed the “accretion exception” rule, but instead addressed the
issues as a straightforward accretion vs. avulsion case. The court there ruled that the
creation of the cutoff was the result of accretion, thus vesting title to the ox-bow lake and
the cut-off peninsula in the riparian owner on the opposite bank. McGee v. Matthews,
supra. Similarly, in a case involving an island on a non-navigable waterway, the same
result was reached on a standard accretion/evulsion analysis. Goforth v. Wilson, 208
Ark. 33, 184 S.W. 2d 665 (1967). Again, this “exception” was not argued or mentioned.
I do not understand why this argument has never been presented to the Arkansas
Supreme Court, as it seems a logical one. In any event, if you encounter this fact pattern,
you should be aware of this exception.
D. Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-404 (Repl. 1996)
In 1945, the Arkansas legislature passed Act No. 203. The legislation was very
clearly intended to provide riparian landowners with a means of acquiring a deed from
the State of Arkansas for lands which had formed in the beds of formerly navigable lakes
and streams. The way the statute is phrased, however, I believe it could be construed as
adopting the “accretion exception” rule. In any event, because the statute provides a
means for obtaining a deed from the State of Arkansas, it is a statute that merits particular
consideration. The statute reads as follows:
“(a) The title to all lands which have formed or may form in the beds of 
non-navigable lakes, or in abandoned river channels or beds, whether or 
not still navigable, which reformed lands or alluvia are above the ordinary
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high water mark, shall vest in the riparian owners to the lands and shall be 
assessed and taxed as other lands.
(b) The lands referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall include 
those lands which have emerged or which may emerge by accretion, 
reliction, evaporation, drainage, or otherwise from the beds of lakes or 
from former navigable streams, whether by natural or artificial causes, or 
whether or not the lakes were originally formed from the channel or 
course of navigable or non-navigable streams.” Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5- 
404 (Repl. 1996).”
This legislation was originally adopted in 1945. In 1953, the language of this
statute was amended. The preamble to the 1953 Act read:
“Whereas, many cutoffs have been made in the Mississippi River, and 
other rivers in the State of Arkansas, both naturally and artificially for the 
purpose of controlling the current of the river and the bank stabilization, 
and many old former river beds have remained as the result of such cutoffs 
and have gradually built up and reached the high water mark as defined by 
the Supreme Court of Arkansas,. . . ,  and permanent timber vegetation has 
grown on all or parts of said old abandoned river beds; and,
Whereas, it is intended hereby to clarify the intent of [Ark. Code Ann. § 
22-5-404], and to eliminate any questions as to the intent thereof;. . . . ”
The 1953 amendments resulted in the statute in its present form.
As originally enacted, the statute included a procedure whereby the riparian
owner could obtain a deed from the State of Arkansas for such lands:
“The Commissioner of State Lands is hereby empowered and authorized 
to execute deeds to such lands to riparian owners upon application and the 
filing of proof of record ownership of adjacent lands and proof of proper 
survey of said lands, conveying all the right, title, and interest of the State 
of Arkansas to such lands as have emerged or may hereafter emerge to the 
mean high water mark of any such stream or lake.”
The latter section is now codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-405 (Repl. 1996). 
When the Arkansas Code of 1989 was adopted, the reference to “such lands” was 
changed to “lands described in § 22-5-404.”
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Surprisingly, there are few cases in which this statute is interpreted or applied. In 
those cases, however, there is no suggestion that the statute modifies the case law 
definitions of, and distinctions between, accretion and avulsion. See, e.g., Porter v. 
Arkansas Western Gas Company, 252 Ark. 958, 482 S.W. 2d 598 (1972). Indeed, the 
cases appear to accept the statute as having been enacted for the sole purpose of 
providing a means for riparian landowners to obtain record title from the State of 
Arkansas to lands that have been formed by accretion in the beds of formerly navigable 
waterways.
Having said that, I would also suggest to you that this statute could be read as a 
legislative adoption of the “accretion exception” rule described in subparagraph (C) 
above. Indeed, particularly in view of the preamble to the 1953 amendments, I don’t see 
how you could read the statute any other way.
Other than to the extent the statute may constitute a legislative adoption of the 
“accretion exception” rule, it appears to me to be consistent with the common law 
definitions of, and distinctions between, accretion and avulsion, and the cases are 
consistent with this reading. In any event, those of you who encounter riparian rights 
issues need to be aware that this statute exists, as it provides a means of obtaining a deed 
from the State of Arkansas for accretions to riparian lands adjoining formerly navigable 
waterways.
E. Apportionment of Alluvion
Assuming land has formed by accretion, the next question which is encountered is 
the problem of dividing the alluvion among the riparian owners. In Malone v. Mobbs,
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102 Ark. 542 (1912), the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the following rule for 
dividing alluvion:
“This rule is laid down for the division of alluvion between the contiguous 
riparian proprietors -  First: To measure the whole extent of the ancient 
bank or line of the river, and compute how many rods, yards or feet each 
riparian proprietor owned on the riverline; Second: Supposing the former 
line for instance to amount to 200 rods, to divide the newly formed bank 
or river line into 200 equal parts, and appropriate to each proprietor as 
many portions of this new river line, as he owned rods on the old; then, to 
complete the division, lines are drawn from the points at which the 
proprietors respectively bounded on the old to the points thus determined 
as the points of division of the newly formed shore.”
The Court went on to note that there may be peculiar circumstances in which use 
of this rule would be inequitable, and that in appropriate circumstances the application of 
this rule might be appropriately modified by a court of equity. Nevertheless, this remains 
the general rule in Arkansas. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Horan. 193 Ark. 85 (1936).
V. Boundary Lines
A. Navigable Waters -  Ordinary High Water Mark
As I mentioned in the historical background at the beginning of this paper, for 
navigable waters the English common law fixed the boundary between the king’s 
ownership of navigable waterways and riparian owners at the high water mark, i.e., high 
tide. Arkansas has adopted this rule by fixing the line at the ordinary high water mark. 
St. Louis. Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Ramsey. 53 Ark. 314 (1890). 
In that case, in discussing where the ordinary high water mark was to be located, the 
Court stated that “what the river does not occupy long enough to rest from vegetation, so 
far as to destroy its value for agriculture, is not river bed.” The Court also said that “the 
banks of a river are those elevations of land which confine the waters when they rise out 
of the bed; and the bed is that soil so usually covered by water as to be distinguishable
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from the bank by the character of the soil, or vegetation, or both, produced by the 
common presence and action of flowing water.” A later case held that the line is to be 
found by “ascertaining where the presence and action of water are so usual and long- 
continued in ordinary years as to mark upon the soil of the bed a character distinct from 
that of the banks in respect to vegetation and the nature of the soil.” State ex rel. 
Thompson v. Parker. 132 Ark. 316 (1917). This definition has remained unchanged to 
the present.
In passing, I note that since the states own to the high water mark, they can adopt 
their own rules as to where the line is to be drawn. For example, Tennessee fixes the 
boundary at the ordinary low water mark. Arkansas v. Tennessee. 246 U.S. 158, 38 S. 
Ct. 301 (1917).
B. States and Counties, and the Rule of the Thalweg
Where a river forms the boundary line between two states or two counties, the 
states or counties are, in effect, riparian owners on opposite banks. If you ask people for 
their knee-jerk reaction to the question of where the boundary should be between the two, 
the vast majority are of the opinion that the boundary line is the exact middle of the river, 
equidistant between the two banks. This is absolutely wrong.
In the case of Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 62 L. Ed. 638, 38 S. Ct. 301 
(1917), the United States Arkansas Supreme Court fixed the boundary line between the 
States of Arkansas and Tennessee. The Court began by summarizing European law 
concerning waters that formed the boundary between two sovereign nations. Under 
European law, the boundary line was fixed at the middle of the navigable channel, or 
thalweg (literally, the “valley way”). If you stop to think about it, the rule makes sense.
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The navigable channel moves back and forth, sometimes adjacent to one bank, sometimes 
adjacent to the other. If the boundary line were the exact middle, neither nation could 
make use of the navigation channel, without trespassing upon the other’s lands. Putting 
the boundary in the exact middle of the deepest part of the channel gave each nation an 
equal right to use the waterway. The United States Supreme Court found the reasoning 
sound, and therefore adopted the rule of the thalweg as the principle to be utilized in 
fixing the boundary between the States of Arkansas and Tennessee. This same rule was 
later applied to a dispute between Arkansas and Mississippi, Arkansas v. Mississippi. 250 
U.S. 39, 63 L. Ed. 832, 39 S. Ct. 422 (1919).
Arkansas has adopted this same rule for fixing the location of the boundary line 
between counties. See Gill v. Porter, 248 Ark. 140, 450 S.W.2d 306 (1970); McGee v. 
Matthews. 241 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
The general rules of accretion and avulsion also apply to the boundary lines 
between states and counties. Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra; Arkansas v. Mississippi. 
supra; DeLoney v. State. 88 Ark. 311, 115 S.W. 138 (1908); Adkisson v. Starr. 222 Ark. 
331, 260 S.W.2d 956 (1953); Gill v. Porter, supra.
One caveat is in order. When determining the boundary between states and 
counties, it is important to examine the treaty, statute, or constitutional provision which 
creates the state or county. If the enabling legislation clearly provides, the boundary can 
be fixed at one bank or the other, rather than the thalweg. For example, the boundary 
between Arkansas and Texas is the south bank of the Red River, not the thalweg. See. 
DeLoney v. State, supra. Similarly, in Gill v. Hedgecock, 207 Ark. 1079, 184 S.W.2d
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262 (1944), the Arkansas Supreme Court noted in dicta that the statute creating Little 
River County fixed the northern boundary line at the north bank of the Little River.
C. Non-Navigable Waters
The cases I have read discussing 18th century English law uniformly speak in 
terms of the “middle” or “center” when discussing the location of the boundary between 
riparian owners on non-navigable waters. The early Arkansas cases are a mix of this 
definition and something that sounds like the rule of the thalweg. Compare Kilgo v. 
Cook, 174 Ark. 432 (1927) (“the middle or thread of the stream”) with McGahhey v. 
McCollum. Administrator. 207 Ark. 180, 179 S.W.2d 661 (1944) (“the riparian owner 
upon a non-navigable stream takes to the center of it.”). The more recent cases, however, 
very clearly hold that the rule of the thalweg applies to non-navigable waterways also. 
See, e.g., Gill v. Porter. 248 Ark. 140,450 S.W.2d 306 (1970).
D. “Fencing” Water
As odd as it sounds, Arkansas law allows riparian owners on non-navigable 
waterways to “fence” their water. In Medlock v. Galbreath. 208 Ark. 681, 187 S.W.2d 
545 (1945), a riparian landowner sought an injunction, excluding commercial fishermen 
from floating their boats over his land. The Court there held that while the land itself 
belonged to the riparian owner, the fish (and presumably the water) did not. The Court 
therefore allowed the fishermen to continue using the waters for their commercial fishing 
operation. The Court expressly noted, however, that the landowner had made no effort to 
enclose his lands with any kind of floating boom or fence. In this regard, the Arkansas 
court cited with approval a Pennsylvania decision in which the Pennsylvania court held, 
clearly and in so many words, that a riparian owner can in fact enclose the waters over his
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land, and upon doing so, the courts will uphold his right to exclude the public from the 
waters overlying his land.
This is still good law in Arkansas. In this regard, I refer you back to the case of 
State v. McIlroy, supra, discussed in the section of this paper dealing with navigability. 
If Medlock v. Galbreath were not the law of Arkansas, the McIlroy decision would have 
been unnecessary. Indeed, in McIlroy the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that the 
chancellor in the trial below had held that the riparian property owners had “the 
incidental right to prevent the public from using the stream.” Id. at 229. The Arkansas 
Supreme Court did not quarrel with this conclusion of the chancellor, but rather accepted 
it at face value and went on to reverse his decision by finding the river navigable, rather 
than by modifying the rule of law announced in Medlock v. Galbreath, supra.
VI. Emerging Lands
A. The General Rule
In its strictest sense, the phrase “emerging lands” refers to a situation where the 
land of a riparian owner has been completely submerged by the gradual movement of a 
river in one direction, then re-emerges when the river moves back in the opposite 
direction. This exact fact pattern was confronted by the Arkansas Supreme Court in 
Younts v. Crockett. 238 Ark. 971, 385 S.W.2d 928 (1965). In that case, Crockett owned 
land platted as Lot 1, and Younts owned land platted as Lot 5. Lot 1 was a narrow strip 
of land bordered on one side by the Arkansas River and on the other by Lot 5. The 
Younts contended that the Arkansas River had gradually shifted until it completely 
submerged all of Lot 1, and that the river thereafter gradually shifted back in the other 
direction until it had returned to its former boundary. The Younts claimed these newly
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formed lands as accretions to Lot 5. The Crocketts, on the other hand, claimed that Lot 1 
had never been completely submerged, and that the newly formed lands were therefore 
accretions to Lot 1.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held in favor of the Crocketts, primarily on the
ground that the Younts, as plaintiffs, had the burden of proof, and they had not proven
that the river had shifted to the point that Lot 1 had been wholly engulfed by the bed of
the river. In reaching this decision, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court announced
very clearly that if it could be shown that the river had shifted to the point that Lot 1 was
completely submerged, it would cease to exist, and if accretions formed thereafter, they
would be accretions to Lot 5, and would not belong to the former owners of Lot 1.
“If the gradual westward movement of the river’s channel finally 
submerged Lot 1, so that it was wholly engulfed by the shifting bed of the 
river, Lot 1 went out of existence. In that event the tract now in dispute 
would have re-emerged as an accretion to Lot 5. (Citation omitted). On 
the other hand, if the western boundary of Lot 1 was submerged only by 
temporary overflows that did not last long enough to establish a new high 
water mark as that term is defined in our cases, Lot 1 was not destroyed. 
(Citation omitted).
Other states would reach a contrary result on these facts. See, e.g., Choctaw and 
Chickasaw Nations v. Tibbetts. 430 F. Supp. 714 (E. D. Okla. 1976) (applying Oklahoma 
law); Bonelli Cattle Company v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 94 S. Ct. 517 (1973) (applying 
federal law). This is still good law in Arkansas, however.
It is also worth mentioning A.C.A. of 22-5-403 (Repl. 1996) again. I read the 
statue as being consistent with the decision in Younts, although no case has ever 
discussed this point.
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B. Islands
A completely different set of rules applies where the “emerging lands” are in the 
form of an island. Arkansas has adopted two statutes concerning islands that form in 
navigable waterways. The earlier statute provides that where islands form in navigable 
waterways within the boundaries of a former owner, such islands belong to the former 
owner.
“All land which has formed or may form in the navigable waters of this 
state, and within the original boundaries of a former owner of land upon 
such waters, shall belong to and the title thereto shall vest in the former 
owner, his heirs or assigns, or in whoever may have lawfully succeeded to 
the right of the former owner therein.” Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-403 (Repl.
1996).
This statute does not apply to accretions to the mainland, but rather concerns only 
islands. Gray v. Malone. 142 Ark. 609, 219 S.W. 742 (1920). Also, this statute is limited 
to that portion of an island that forms within the boundaries of a former owner. If the 
island extends by accretion outside the former boundaries, the usual rules of accretion do 
not apply; ownership stops at the former boundary. Mills v. Protho, et al., 143 Ark. 117, 
219 S.W. 1017 (1920). Presumably, if the island initially formed outside the boundaries 
of the former owner, but extended by accretion across the former boundary, the former 
owner would own the accretions to the island which formed within his original 
boundaries.
The second statute is Ark. Code Ann. § 22-6-202(A) (Repl. 1996). That statute 
provides:
“All islands formed or which may form in the navigable waters of this 
State are declared to be the property of the State . . . . ”
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One would think, upon reading this statute and § 22-5-403, that the two statutes 
are mutually exclusive. The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, has held that they are 
not. Ward v. Harwood. 239 Ark. 69, 387 S.W. 2d 318 (1965). In that case, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court held that § 22-6-202 applies only to islands that form in navigable 
waterways, outside the boundaries of a former owner.
In regard to islands forming in non-navigable waterways, the only question is 
determining the location of the thalweg. See, e.g., Goforth v. Wilson. 208 Ark. 33, 184 
S.W.2d 814 (1945), in which the litigation concerned ownership of an island. The proof 
established that historically the main channel of the river had been on the south side of 
the island, while there had been only a slough on the north side of the island, completely 
submerged only during times of high water. By the time of trial, however, the proof 
established that the main channel of the river had shifted to the north side of the island, 
such that only a slough was left on the south side, again fully submerged only in times of 
high water. After accepting that the movement was due to accretion, the court there held 
that ownership of the island was determined by ascertaining which side of the main 
channel the river was located on.
In the situation where accretions to an island and the mainland grow until they 
join, the owners of the island and the owners of the mainland take to the point where they 
join. Cummings v. Boyles. 242 Ark. 38, 411 S.W.2d 665 (1967). Also, I again refer you 
to Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-404 (Repl. 1996). The statute may have some relevance to 
islands, depending on the specific facts.
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VII. What Happens to Severed Minerals?
There are no Arkansas cases which address the question of what happens to 
severed minerals, when surface boundaries move due to accretion. Oklahoma, Montana, 
and Texas, however, have each held that severed minerals move with the surface estate. 
Nilsen v. Tenneco Oil Company, 614 P.2d 36 (Okla. 1980); Jackson v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc., 205 Mont. 200, 667 P.2d 406 (1983); Ely v. Brilev. 959 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. 
1998). The result in these cases has been criticized in two Law Review articles, 
Murphree, “Oil and Gas: The Inapplicability o f Accretion to Severed Mineral Estate, ” 
34 Okla. L. Rev. 826 (1981), and Kimball, Accretion and Severed Mineral Estates, 53 
Univ. of Chic. L. Rev. 232 (1986
VIII. Miscellaneous Issues
A. Conveyances by the United States Prior to Statehood
In Section I of this paper, I noted that the original thirteen colonies acquired title 
to navigable waterways upon declaring their independence from Great Britain, as the 
sovereign successors to the English crown. When subsequent states were admitted, they 
acquired the same rights to navigable waterways, under the “equal footing” doctrine. At 
the same time, however, most subsequently admitted states, to include Arkansas, 
acquired their title from the United States of America. The question therefore arises: 
Was it possible for the United States to convey the title of navigable waterways to third 
parties, prior to statehood? The answer to this question is yes, although the 
circumstances in which this arises are very limited.
In the case of Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma. 397 U.S. 619, 90A S. Ct. 1328 
(1970), the Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Cherokee Nations asserted title to the bed of the
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Arkansas River from the head of navigation at the confluence of the Grand and Arkansas 
Rivers in northeast Oklahoma downstream to the Arkansas border. The case includes a 
fascinating discussion of the history of riparian rights and Indian law, particularly the 
various treaties between the United States and the five civilized tribes. In the end, the 
United States Supreme Court concluded that by virtue of various treaties, principally the 
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, the United States had effectively conveyed fee title to a 
navigable waterway (the Arkansas River) to the Indian Nations. Thus, when Oklahoma 
was later admitted as a state, it did not acquire title to the bed of the navigable portion of 
the Arkansas River.
Since the Choctaw decision, there have been no other cases decided in which the 
Supreme Court has held that the United States did in fact convey fee title to navigable 
waterways to a third party prior to statehood. Indeed, in Utah Division of State Lands v. 
The United States, 482 U.S. 191, 96 L. Ed. 2d 162, 107 S. Ct. 2318 (1987), the Supreme 
Court noted that the Choctaw decision was the sole case in which this result was reached. 
Nevertheless, the decision does establish that it is at least possible that the United States 
conveyed the title to the bed of a navigable waterway to a third party, prior to statehood, 
and that the state therefore does not own it. I do not know of any instance in which this 
occurred in Arkansas, but if by chance you encounter a Patent from the United States 
which purports to convey the bed of a navigable waterway to an individual, prior to 
statehood, you should at least recognize that the individual may have a valid claim to the 
bed of the waterway.
One interesting footnote to the Choctaw case is the position the Indian Nations are 
presently taking. As I understand it, the Indian Nations are now contending that they
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own the bed of the river, not only where it is presently located, but anywhere it has ever 
been located at any time in the past, to include property that has been dry land for many 
years. I anticipate it will be interesting to watch the development of these claims, 
particularly in light of the fact that the Indian Nations cannot be made a party to litigation 
without their consent.
B. State Law Does Not Always Govern
One practical effect of the acquisition of title to navigable waterways upon 
statehood is that state law governs all disputes and controversies over ownership of 
navigable waterways. See Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra. Where the riparian owner is 
the United States of America, however, this general rule does not apply.
In California ex rel. State Lands Commission v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 73 
L. Ed. 2d 1, 103 S. Ct. 14 (1982), the United States owned a Coast Guard station on 
riparian lands bordering navigable waterways, the bed of which was owned by the State 
of California. The federal government built dikes and revetments for navigation 
purposes, which had the practical effect of causing accretions to the Coast Guard station 
land. California law would have held that the lands belonged to the State of California, 
as the accretions were the result of artificial rather than natural causes. The United States 
Supreme Court, however, held that federal law governed in this particular circumstance, 
and that under federal law, the accretions belonged to the riparian landowner, the United 
States.
The point to be made here is that if you encounter a situation in which the United 
States is the riparian landowner, you should be conscious of the fact that you may be 
playing by a different set of rules.
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C. Payment of Taxes and Adverse Possession
The payment of taxes on riparian lands amounts to payment of taxes on accretions 
to such land. River Land Company v. McAlexander, 10 Ark. App. 123, 661 S.W.2d 451 
(1983). At the same time, however, Arkansas would apparently hold that adverse 
possession of riparian lands does not necessarily include accretions to that land. See,e.g., 
Sherman v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Company. 233 Ark. 277, 344 S.W.2d 345 (1961), 
in which the court held that Sherman had established title to an island by adverse 
possession, and River Land Company v. McAlexander, supra, in which the court held 
that the decision in Sherman only vested title in the adverse possessor to the bank, and 
that the adverse possessor was therefore not a riparian owner entitled to accretions. This 
doesn’t seem to make any sense, but that is the holding of the cases.
Although it sounds odd, by building a dam and permanently flooding private 
property, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the state can adversely possess 
private land. State ex rel. Thompson v. Parker. 132 Ark. 316(1917). I can’t imagine this 
result would ever be reached today, particularly in light of the due process clause and 
Ark. Code Ann. Sec 22-5-404. Nevertheless, in 1917, the Arkansas Supreme Court so 
held.
With the exception of these minor points, the usual principles of adverse 
possession are equally applicable to riparian ownership. Sherman v. Chicago Mill and 
Lumber Company, supra.
D. Conveyancing Rules
Arkansas adheres to the general rule that conveyances of riparian lands are 
presumed to include any accretions thereto, whether accurately described in the deed or
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not. Gill v. Hedgecock. 207 Ark. 1079, 184 S.W.2d 262 (1944). This is not to say that a 
conveyance, if sufficiently clear, cannot reserve or except accretions, exclude the bed of 
the waterway, or make the bank the boundary. To the contrary, if the intent is clear, it 
will be given effect. See, e.g., Kilgo v. Cook. 174 Ark. 432 (1927); Perry v. Sadler. 76 
Ark. 43 (1905).
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STREAMS CONSIDERED NAVIGABLE 
IN LITTLE ROCK DISTRICT 
("NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE U.S.")
1 A u g u s t  198 2
Stream Tributary of
Head of Navigable 
navigation length in
LRD miles, 
approx.
Total 
navigab 
length 
mil es 
approx
Arkansas River White River Mouth of Grand (Neosho) 
River, Oklahoma 
(Head of Nav. not in LRD)
303 391
White River
(mile 0+010 and 255
Mississippi River 
to 686)
Goshen, AR (Hwy 45 Bridge) 
31-17-28W, Washington Co., AR 
(Portion of White Riv. between 
McClellan-Kerr Ark Riv Nav 
System Lock #1 and mile 10, and 
Newport, Ark, at mile 255 are 
under jurisdiction of Memphis 
District)
441 686
Black River White River Mengo, MO (Mo-Pac R.R. Bridge) 
22-25N-6E, Butler Co., MO
218 218
Big Maumelle 
River
Arkansas River Lake Maumelle Dam 
34-3N-14W, Pulaski Co., AR
6 6
Buffalo River White River Mouth of Rush Creek 
11-17N-15W, Marion Co., AR
22 22
Cadron Creek Arkansas River Pleasant Valley, AR (Mouth 
East Fork)
9-6N-14W, Faulkner Co., AR
8 8
Current River Black River Van Buren, MO (Hwy 60) 
24-27N-1W, Carter Co., MO
90 90
Eleven Point 
River
Spring River Bardley, MO (Hwy 160) 
19-23N-2W, Oregon Co., MO
54 54
Fourche Creek Arkansas River Little Rock, AR 
16-N-12W, Pulaski Co., AR
9.2 9.;
Fourche LaFave 
River
Arkansas River Perryville, AR (Hwy 9) 
15-4N-17W, Perry Co., AR
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STREAMS CONSIDERED NAVIGABLE 
IN LITTLE ROCK DISTRICT 
("NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE U.S.") 
(continued)
1 A u g u s t  1982
Total :
Head of Navigable navigable
Stream Tributary of navigation length in length ir
LRD miles, miles,
________________________________________________________________________approx.____approx.
Greers Ferry Lake Little Red River Dam to Devils Fork mile 11.5 71 71
(Lat 92⁰02'N)
NE3-11N-10W, Cleburne Co., AR 
Middle Fork mile 10.5 (92°15', 
35⁰39')
NW NE 27-12N-12W, Van Buren Co., AR 
and South Fork mile 21.5 (92°26', 
35°34 ')
NW NW 25-11N-14W, Van Buren Co., AR
Illinois Bayou Arkansas River Shiloh, AR (Russellville Water 
Supply Dam)
SE SW 17-8N-20W, Pope Co., AR
12 12
Lake Langhofer Arkansas River Pine Bluff, AR (Cutoff Dam) 
16-5S-9W, Jefferson Co., AR
5 5
Lee Creek Arkansas River Van Buren, AR
SW SW 4-9N-32W, Crawford Co., AR
6 6
Little Maumelle 
River
Arkansas River Pinnacle, AR (Hwy 300 Bridge) 
3-2N-14W, Pulaski Co., AR
8.6 8.6
Little Red River White River Bee Rock, AR
SE SW 36-8N-7W, White Co., AR
31 31
Mulberry River Arkansas River Mulberry, AR (I-40 Bridge) 
24-10N-29W, Frankl in-Crawford 
Co., AR
6 6
North Fork River 
-Norfork Lake
White River Dawt, MO (Unnamed Road Crossing) 
3-22N-12W, Ozark Co., MO
50 50
Petit Jean River Arkansas River Rocky Crossing, AR (Hwy 7) 
23-5N-21W, Yell Co., AR
.24 .24
Spring River Black River Sloan, Arkansas 
South Line Sec 25,
North Line Sec 36-18N-2W, 
Lawrence-Randolph Co., AR
8 8
2
STREAMS CONSIDERED NAVIGABLE 
IN LITTLE ROCK DISTRICT 
("NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE U.S.")
(continued)
1 August 1982
Stream Tributary of
Head of 
navigation
Navigable 
length in 
LRD miles, 
approx.
Total 
navigabl 
length i 
miles, 
approx.
Little River Red River Millwood Dam 16 16
Red River Navigable from Fulton, AR 
(463.0) to Index, AR (485.3) 
in Little Rock District. 
Intermittent portions in 
other Districts are also 
navigable, both upstream 
and downstream
22.3
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Charlie Daniels
Commissioner
March 29,1999
State of Arkansas 
Commissioner of State Lands 
Mr. Robert M. Honea 
HARDIN, JESSON & TERRY 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 10127 
Fort Smith, AR 72917-0127
RE: Cutoff
Dear Mr. Honea:
For your review, I enclose a copy of Attorney General Mark Pryor’s Opinion
issued in response to Commissioner Daniels’ request dated December 21, 1998. As 
anticipated, the opinion does not answer the ultimate question of ownership, however, it 
does provide an excellent outline of relevant statutory and case law.
Having thoroughly reviewed the opinion, the Commissioner’s current position is that the 
state holds title to the Cutoff. As the opinion correctly points out, the issue of
title to beds of navigable rivers is fact intensive. Consequently, prior to divesting the state of 
ownership, certain facts must be unequivocally established. The situation addressed in your 
letter actually creates two separate fact situations in that your description of the property 
refers to both dry land and land that is currently under water.
In the latter case, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated Section 22-5-405, the dry land 
created from the river bed may be subject to conveyance by the state to the riparian 
landowners assuming certain facts are proved. Accordingly, a statutory scheme exists for the 
determination of ownership in cases involving dry land in abandoned river channels. On the 
other hand, however, there is no clear statutory scheme for determining the navigability of a 
waterway which is the issue created by the land that is currently still underwater. Ownership 
to this land rests on the issue of navigability. The Commissioner is neither equipped nor 
empowered to determine whether waterways are navigable and therefore relies on 
determinations made by the U.S. Corps of Engineers. Obviously, there has been a 
determination that the Arkansas River is navigable. Consequently, until proven otherwise, 
the Commissioner of State Lands can only assume that waterways created by the river are 
navigable as well.
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I am hopeful the above adequately sets fort Commissioner Daniels’ position on this matter. 
Should you have any questions, or, wish to discuss this subject further, please feel free to call 
me.
Yours very truly,
  
Carol L. Lincoln 
Staff Attorney
Commissioner of State Lands
CLL/lp
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARKANSAS 
Mark Pryor
March 5,1999
The Honorable Charlie Daniels 
Commissioner o f State Lands 
State Capitol
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 
Dear Mr. Daniels:
This is in response to your request for an opinion regarding the ownership o f 
certain land located in the Arkansas River. Specifically, you have enclosed a copy 
o f a letter from a Fort Smith attorney asking whether the State “ claims title to the 
former beds o f the Arkansas River which were cut o ff as a result o f the 
channelization o f the river by the Corps o f Engineers in the 1960s.” The letter 
refers to an area known as the “ Cutoff” which is described in the
letter as “literally a channel created by the Corps o f Engineers into which the body 
o f the Arkansas River was diverted. The letter notes that “[t]he former bed o f the 
Arkansas River which was cut o ff by this channel was described as the
The letter continues by stating that: “the former bed o f the Arkansas 
River commonly described as was completely cut off as a result o f
the channelization, i.e., there is now no access to it from the Arkansas River with 
the possible exception o f extreme flooding conditions. Portions o f the former bed 
o f the river are now dry land; other portions remain underwater.” The letter poses 
the following question to your office, which you have now forwarded for my 
opinion:
Given the foregoing facts, does the State o f Arkansas 
claim title to the oil , gas, and minerals underlying the 
bed o f the Arkansas River as it was formerly located 
before it was cut o ff by the channelization o f the
323 Center Street • Suite 200 • Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 
(501) 682-2007 • FAX (501) 682-8084 
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Arkansas River? In responding to this inquiry, I 
specifically refer you to the following cases:
Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas, 252 Ark. 958, 482 
S.W.2d 598 (1972); United States o f America v.
Keenan. 753 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1985).
You state that “[i]n reviewing the information provided, as well as relevant case 
law, it would appear that if  the Cutoff1 is no longer navigable, then
ownership o f the channel would revert to the riparian owners and the state would 
no longer claim it.” You state that you are reluctant, however, to issue your 
opinion on this matter, particularly as it relates to oil and gas rights, as the 
“Natural Resources Commission” has “exclusive authority over the leasing o f oil 
and gas rights owned by the state."2 You therefore ask my opinion “in response to 
the inquiry [the letter o f the attorney] enclosed.”
I must note in response to your request that the question posed by the Fort Smith 
attorney (“[w]hether or not [the state] claims title to the former beds o f the 
Arkansas River”), is not a question o f law upon which I can issue a formal legal 
opinion.
The underlying question is whether the State o f Arkansas owns title to the bed o f 
the  Questions involving the title to beds o f navigable rivers are fact
intensive. See e.g. 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters, § 3. In the issuance o f official 
legal opinions, I am not empowered or equipped to act as a factfinder, and to
1 It appears that It is the land underlying the and not the “ Cutoff,” which is
at issue.
2 This Committee is created at A.C.A. § 22-5-804, and is composed o f the Director o f DF&A or his
the Director o f the Oil and Gas Commission, The State Geologist, the State Forester, the Director 
o f the Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commission, the Commissioner o f State Lands, the Director 
o f the State Game and Fish Commission, the Director o f the Department o f Parks and Tourism or his
the Director o f the Arkansas Department o f Pollution Control and Ecology, and the Director o f 
the Natural Heritage Commission. The only statutory powers granted the Committee appear to be the 
establishment o f a  schedule o f minimum fees and royalties, as well as the terms and conditions for various 
types o f permits and leases, and the changing o f such schedule and terms. See A .C A . § 22-5-804 ( c) and 
(d). It appears that you, as Commissioner o f State Lands, have the authority to actually grant leases and 
permits for the taking o f oil and gas from the beds o f navigable waters and other state lands. See A. C .A. § 
22-5-801.
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definitively determine an issue based upon a statement of the facts given by one 
party to the dispute (such as posed in the letter enclosed with your request).
In an effort to be helpful, however, I can set out the relevant law on the topic, 
which may then be applied to the facts as you find them.
The State o f Arkansas, o f course, owns title to the beds o f all navigable waterways 
within the state. See Hayes v. State, 254 Ark. 680, 496 S.W.2d 372 (1973); Clarke 
v. Montgomery County, 268 Ark. 942, 597 S.W.2d 96 (Ark. App. 1980); 
McGahhey v. McCollum, 207 Ark. 180, 179 S.W.2d 661 (1944); Barboro v. Boyle, 
119 Ark. 377, 178 S.W. 378 (1915); Stale v. Southern Sand & Material Co., 113 
Ark. 149, 167 S.W. 854 (1914). It has been stated that:
When the Original Colonies ratified the Constitution, 
they succeeded to the Crown’s title and interest in the 
beds o f navigable waters within their respective 
borders. See Utah Division o f  State Lands v. United 
States, 482 U.S. 193, 195-96, 107 S.C t. 2318,2320-21,
96 L. Ed.2d 162 (1987); Bonelli Cattle Co., v. Arizona,
414 U.S. 313, 317-318, 94 S.C t. 517, 521-522, 38 
L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), overruled on other grounds,
Oregon ex rel. State Land. Board v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 97 S.Ct. 582, 50 L.Ed. 2d 
550 (1977). Under the equal footing doctrine, new 
states were admitted with ‘the same rights, sovereignty 
and jurisdiction . . .  as the original States possess 
within their respective borders.’ Bonelli, 414 U.S. at 
318, 94 S.C t. at 522. Accordingly, title to lands 
beneath navigable waters passed from the federal 
government to the states upon their admission to the 
Union.
101 Ranch v. U.S., 905 F.2d 180, 182 (8th Cir. 1990).
This is true assuming there had been no valid federal grant o f particular land to an 
individual prior to the state’s admission to the Union. Utah Division o f State 
Lands v. United States, supra
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While the application o f the “equal footing doctrine” to the states at the time of 
their admission to the Union requires reference to and construction o f federal law, 
thereafter the role o f the equal-footing doctrine is ended, and the land is subject to 
the laws o f the State. California ex re l. State Lands Commission v. United States, 
457 U.S. 273 (1982) and Corvallis, supra. State law will therefore control the 
question o f whether the State o f Arkansas has been divested o f title to the property 
in question. Id.
Arkansas law on the subject is derived from both statutes and the common law. 
The most relevant Arkansas statute is A .C A . § 22-5-404 (Repl. 1996), which is 
the codification o f two Acts o f Arkansas, Acts 1945, No. 203 and Acts 1953, No. 
126. The statute currently provides as follows:
(a) The title to all lands which have formed or may 
form in the beds o f nonnavigable lakes, or in 
abandoned river channels or beds, whether or not still 
navigable, which reformed lands or alluvia are above 
the ordinary high-water mark, shall vest in the riparian 
owners to the lands and shall be assessed and taxed as 
other lands.
(b) The lands referred to in subsection (a) o f this 
section shall include those lands which have emerged 
or which may emerge by accretion, reliction, 
evaporation, drainage, or otherwise from the beds o f 
lakes or from former navigable streams, whether by 
natural or artificial causes, or whether  or not the lakes 
were originally formed from the channel or course o f 
navigable or nonnavigable streams.
The original Act 203 o f 1945 applied only to lands emerging from nonnavigable 
lakes. The 1953 act expanded the section to include the language about 
abandoned river channels. In fa c t, the preamble to Act 126 o f 1953 recites the 
following:
WHEREAS many cut-offs have been made in the 
Mississippi river, and other rivers in the State o f 
Arkansas, both naturally and artificially for the
Mr. Charlie Daniels
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purpose o f controlling the current o f the river and the 
bank stabilization, and many old former river beds 
have remained as the result o f such cut-offs and have 
gradually built up and reached the high-water mark as 
defined by the Supreme Court o f Arkansas in the case 
o f S t Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v.
Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931, and permanent 
timber vegetation has grown on all or part o f said old 
abandoned river beds, and
WHEREAS it is intended hereby to clarify the intent 
o f Act 203 o f the General Assembly approved March 
8, 1945, and to eliminate any question as to the intent 
thereof;
THEREFORE, Sections 1 and 2 o f Act 203 o f the 
1945 General Assembly are hereby respectively 
amended to read as follows . . . .
It has been stated that Act 126 o f 1953 “was designed to furnish a means whereby 
the State could acknowledge that a river bed has been abandoned.” Gill v. Porter, 
248 Ark. 140, 450 S.W.2d 306 (1970).
The 1953 act left unamended sections 3 and 4 o f the original 1945 act, which 
authorize the State Land Commissioner to execute deeds to the lands described in 
the statute to adjacent riparian landowners assuming certain listed conditions are 
m et See current A.C.A . § 22-5-4Q5 (Repl. 1996). A survey o f the lands in 
question is required. A.C.A . § 22-5-405(a) and (b). The land at issue must have 
emerged to the “mean high-water mark o f any such stream or lake ” A.C.A . § 22- 
5-405 (a). Affidavits must be filed to this effect and must state that the lands are 
“capable o f cultivation.” See A.C.A. § 22-5-405(d).
Although there is no case precisely on point, it appears that the statute applies 
notwithstanding the fact that the land emerged from an artificial cause, or from 
what might be termed in the common law an “avulsive,” rather than an “accretive” 
event. The statute, at least as regards the state's title, appears to change what is 
the generally accepted common-law rule that land exposed by an avulsion will not 
operate to change ownership or the boundary o f a given tract, while land formed
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by an accretion will. See e.g. 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters, §§82 and 86 (b). See 
also, Horne v. Howe Lumber C o . 209 Ark. 2 0 2 , 190 S.W.2d 7 (1945), and Garrett 
v. Sta te, 118 N J. Super. 594, 289 A.2d 542 (1972). The statute includes lands 
which have emerged from natural or artificial causes, by “accretion, reliction, 
evaporation, drainage, or otherwise. . . A.C.A . § 22-5-405 (b) (emphasis 
added). The statute, as it relates to the rights o f private riparian owners as against 
each other, appears to have been applied in conjunction with the common law 
doctrines o f accretion and avulsion to determine the appropriate boundary.3 See 
e.g., Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas Co., 252 Ark. 958, 482 S.W.2d 598 (1972) 
and G ill v. Porter, 248 Ark. 140, 450 S.W 2 d  306 (1970). See also, United States 
V . Keenan,753 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1985).
Clearly, this statute was intended to allow the state to divest itself o f title to lands 
emerged from a river bed after the construction o f a “cut-off” The statute only 
applies, however, to “lands” which have emerged to the high water mark. It does 
not appear to apply to lands still under water. The letter enclosed with your 
request indicates that “[p]ortions o f the former bed o f the river are now dry land; 
other portions remain underwater .”
As regards lands still underwater, or below the ordinary high water mark, common 
law principles must be applied. It is held in Arkansas, in contrast to the majority 
o f states, that because the state’s tide to the land under water rests on navigability, 
when the navigation ceases the tide terminates, and riparian rights attach. See 
Parker, Commissioner o f  Revenue v. Moore, 222 Ark. 811, 262 S.W.2d 891 
(1953), relying on Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781 (8th Cir. 1906). See also United 
Stales v. Keenan, supra; Gill v. Porter, supra; Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas 
Co., sup ra, and Five Lakes Outing Club  v. Horseshoe Lake. Protective Association, 
226 Ark. 136, 288 S.W.2d 942 (1956). Compare 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters, § 
97. A  determination, therefore, o f the tide to the lands still under water will 
require a finding as to the water’s navigability. This is an inherently factual 
question. If no longer “navigable,” Arkansas common law provides that riparian
3 It appears, additionally, that the doctrines o f accretion and avulsion are still relevant for determining any 
county boundary issues arising from the subject property. See eg. Adkisson v. Starr, 222 Ark. 331, 260 
S.W.2 d  956 (1953); Deloney v. State, 88 A rk. 311,115 S.W. 138 (1908); and Matthews v. McGee, 358 F.2d 
516 (8th Cir. 1966). The correspondence enclosed with your request indicates that foe subject property is 
located in “Crawford and Sebastian Counties." The Arkansas River is foe boundary between those 
counties. See Fulton Ferry & Bridge Co. v. Blackwood, 173 Ark. 645,293 S.W. 2 (1927).
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ownership attaches at the time the waters became nonnavigable. See Keenan, 
supra, and Gill v. Porter, supra.
While I cannot provide a definitive resolution o f the question posed, I hope the 
foregoing recitation o f the law is helpful in your approach to this issue.
Senior Assistant Attorney General Elana C. Wills prepared the foregoing opinion, 
which I hereby approve.
Sincerely,
MARK PRYOR
Attorney General
MP:ECW/cyh
439 STATE LANDS GENERALLY 22-5-403
22-5-403. Title to lands formed in navigable waters.
(a) All land which has formed or may form in the navigable waters of 
this state, and within the original boundaries of a former owner of land 
upon such waters, shall belong to and the title thereto shall vest in the 
former owner, his heirs or assigns, or in whoever may have lawfully 
succeeded to the right of the former owner therein.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the rights or 
interests of third parties in any such land acquired before the passage 
of this section.
22-5-404. Title to lands formed in nonnavigable lakes or aban-
doned river channels.
(a) The title to all lands which have formed or may form in the beds 
of nonnavigable lakes, or in abandoned river channels or beds, whether 
or not still navigable, which reformed lands or alluvia are above the 
ordinary high-water mark, shall vest in the riparian owners to the 
lands and shall be assessed and taxed as other lands.
(b) The lands referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall include 
those lands which have emerged or which may emerge by accretion, 
reliction, evaporation, drainage, or otherwise from the beds of lakes or 
from former navigable streams, whether by natural or artificial causes, 
or whether or not the lakes were originally formed from the channel or 
course of navigable or nonnavigable streams.
22-5-405. Deeds to lands in lakes or rivers.
(a) The Commissioner of State Lands is empowered and authorized 
to execute deeds to lands described in § 22-5-404 to riparian owners 
upon application and the filing of proof of record ownership of adjacent 
lands and proof of proper survey of the lands, conveying all the right, 
title, and interest of the State of Arkansas to lands as have emerged or 
may emerge to the mean high-water mark of any such stream or lake.
(b) All applicants for deeds under this section shall, upon filing an 
application therefor, deposit with the Commissioner of State Lands the 
estimated cost of survey of the lands to be fixed by the Commissioner of 
State Lands. He shall thereupon direct the county surveyor of the 
county in which the lands are located, or some other competent 
surveyor to be selected by the Commissioner of State Lands, to 
accurately survey the lands and compile the field notes and plat the 
lands in reference to the survey of adjacent lands, by the extension of 
township, range, and section lines, and to file the field notes and plats 
in the office of the Commissioner of State Lands.
(c) Upon the filing of the field notes and plats, the Commissioner of 
State Lands shall pay for the cost of the survey of lands applied for out 
of the money deposited as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(d) The applicant shall, after the filing of the field notes and survey, 
file affidavits of at least three (3) competent persons having full 
personal knowledge of the facts, stating that the lands applied for have 
actually emerged to high-water mark and are capable of cultivation, 
whereupon the Commissioner of State Lands may issue the deed upon 
the payment of a deed fee of five dollars ($5.00).
22-5-406. L im ited quitclaim  of stream bed  of M ulberry River.
(a) The State of Arkansas quitclaims, to the owners of adjacent 
lands, title to the streambed of the Mulberry River, excluding oil, gas, 
and other mineral rights underlying the stream, to the center of the 
stream. However, the state retains an easement to run with the land for 
free passage by the public over the land by canoe, boat, other water- 
craft, swimming, wading, or walking, and for fishing, recreation, travel, 
commerce, and other purposes.
(b) (1) The State of Arkansas relinquishes and quitclaims to the 
owners of oil, gas, and other minerals underlying adjacent lands, and to 
their lessees, all right, title, and interest in and to the oil, gas, and other 
minerals underlying the bed of the Mulberry River.
(2) No affirmative action shall be required by the mineral owner or 
lessee, of the State of Arkansas to enable the mineral owner or lessee to 
retain ownership of or leasehold interest in the minerals under the bed 
of the Mulberry River.
(3) (A) If the mineral owner or lessee desires record proof of his 
continued ownership of the oil, gas, and other minerals, he may file 
an application with the Commissioner of State Lands for a quitclaim 
deed covering the oil, gas, and other minerals under the bed of the 
river.
(B) If the lands have been surveyed and platted, the mineral owner 
may furnish the Commissioner of State Lands a copy of the survey 
and plat.
(C) If the survey and plat sufficiently identify the land, no further 
survey shall be required.
(4) (A) In the alternative, the mineral owner may file with his 
application a deposit of the estimated cost of a survey, and the 
Commissioner shall direct the county surveyor of the county in which 
the lands are located, or some other competent surveyor, to make an 
accurate survey of the lands and to plat them in reference to the 
survey of adjacent lands and file the survey and plat in the Office of 
the Commissioner of State Lands.
(B) Upon the filing of the survey and plat, the Commissioner shall 
pay for the cost of the survey out of the money deposited as provided 
in subdivision (d)(1) of this section.
(C) If the deposit is insufficient for that purpose, the Commissioner 
may require an additional deposit.
(D) If any deposited funds remain after payment, they shall be 
refunded to the depositor.
(5) After the survey and plat are filed, the applicant shall file 
affidavits of at least two (2) competent persons having full personal 
knowledge of the facts, establishing that the applicant is the present 
owner or lessee of the minerals in and under the streambed.
(6) Upon receipt of the survey and affidavits, the Commissioner of 
State Lands may issue a quitclaim deed to the applicant upon the 
payment of a deed fee of one dollar ($1.00). The quitclaim deed 
establishes that the state makes no claim to the oil, gas, and other 
minerals under the bed of the stream.
22-5-815. Mineral rights in lands covered by artificially created 
navigable waters.
(a) The State of Arkansas shall not acquire title to the oil, gas, and 
other minerals in and under lands covered by navigable waters artifi-
cially created by agencies of the United States or the State of Arkansas 
in any instance where the underlying minerals are not purchased or 
condemned and compensation paid therefor.
(b) The private ownership of the oil, gas, and other minerals in and 
under lands covered by artificially created navigable waters as estab-
lished by this section shall be subservient to, and the exercise of rights 
of extraction and removal thereof shall not be permitted to interfere 
with or impair, the rights of public navigation, transportation, fishing, 
and recreation in and upon such navigable waters.
(c) No affirmative action shall be required by the mineral owner or 
the State of Arkansas to enable the mineral owner to retain ownership 
of the minerals in and under the artificially inundated lands.
(d) (1) If the mineral owner desires record proof of his continued 
ownership of the minerals, he may file an application with the Com-
missioner of State Lands for a quitclaim deed covering the minerals in 
and under the inundated lands.
(2) If the inundated lands have been surveyed and platted by an 
agency of the United States or the State of Arkansas, the mineral owner 
may furnish a copy of the survey and plat to the Commissioner of State 
Lands.
(3) If the survey and plat sufficiently identify the land, no further 
survey shall be required.
(e) (1) In the alternative, the mineral owner may file a deposit of the 
estimated cost of a survey with his application, and the Commissioner 
shall direct the county surveyor of the county in which the lands are 
located, or some other competent surveyor, to make an accurate survey 
of the lands and to plat them in reference to the survey of adjacent 
lands and file the survey and plat in the office of the Commissioner of 
State Lands.
(2) Upon the filing of the survey and plat, the Commissioner of State 
Lands shall pay for the cost of the survey out of the money deposited as 
provided in subdivision (e)(1) of this section.
(3) If the deposit is insufficient for that purpose, the Commissioner of 
State Lands may require an additional deposit.
(4) If any deposited funds remain after payment, they shall be 
refunded to the depositor.
(f) After the survey and plat of the agency of the United States or the 
State of Arkansas or the survey and plat of the surveyor selected by the 
Commissioner of State Lands are filed, the applicant shall file affidavits 
of at least two (2) competent persons having fu ll personal knowledge of 
the facts, establishing that the applicant is the present owner of the 
minerals in and under the lands shown in the survey and that the lands 
have been inundated without payment of compensation for the miner-
als by an agency of the United States or the State of Arkansas.
(g) Upon receipt of the survey and affidavits, the Commissioner of 
State Lands may issue a quitclaim deed to the applicant upon the 
payment of a deed fee of one dollar ($1.00). The quitclaim deed shall 
establish that the state has no claim in and makes no claim to the oil, 
gas, and other minerals in and under the lands described in the survey.
(h) The State of Arkansas quitclaims and relinquishes to the previ-
ous mineral owner and his successors and assigns all of the state’s 
right, title, and interest to the oil, gas, and other minerals in and under 
lands covered prior to February 23, 1965, by artificially created navi-
gable waters caused by an agency of the United States or the State of 
Arkansas and for which compensation has not been paid.
(i) If the previous mineral owner desires record proof of his continued 
ownership of the minerals, he may follow the procedure outlined in this 
section and obtain a quitclaim deed from the Commissioner of State 
Lands.
(a) All islands formed or which may form in the navigable waters of 
this state are declared to be the property of the state, except as provided 
in § 22-6-204, and subject to sale and disposition in the manner and 
form provided in this subchapter.
(b) The Commissioner of State Lands shall have full power and 
authority to lease or grant submerged lands and the Commissioner of 
State Lands shall promulgate rules and regulations as may be neces-
sary to effectively carry out the provisions of this section, and, upon 
adoption, such rules and regulations shall have the full force and effect 
of law.
22-6-202. P roperty  o f state.
